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Despite having put the concept of HPS on the institutional map, N.R. Hanson’s 
distinctive account of the interdependence between history of science and 
philosophy of science has been mostly forgotten, and misinterpreted where it is 
remembered. It is argued that Hanson’s account is worthy of renewed attention 
and extension since, through its special emphasis on a variety of different 
normative criteria, it provides the framework for a fruitful and transformative 
interaction between the two disciplines. This essay also examines two separate 
threads of Hanson’s account of philosophy of science: his analysis of the 
conceptual dynamics of science and of the interrelation of the history and 
philosophy of science. While the two strands appear incongruent, and were 
perhaps inconsistent, a new interpretation of them is offered which is both 
consistent with Hanson’s fundamental intuitions and defensible in its own right. It 
is demonstrated that Hanson’s account compares favorably with those of Kuhn 
and Lakatos, and that it may provide a constructive means of scaling the barriers 





The relationship between philosophy of science and history of science has been vexed ever since 
it became commonplace to regard them as complementary disciplines. Ronald Giere voiced what 
has been the standard metaphor depicting their relationship as a “marriage of convenience” at 
                                               
 A note on the text: this article is a draft of Chapter 5 of  N.R. Hanson: Observation, Discovery, and Scientific 
Change (Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 2010). Scholars are encouraged to cite that source. (Noted added in 
January 2013, MDL). 
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best – each discipline has to do with science, and to that extent, they are bound together1. The 
presence and creation of interdisciplinary programs demonstrates the existence of a need, on the 
part of both philosophers and historians, for one another’s insights, but there is no consensus on 
what the nature of their relationship should be, and most well-known formulations of the nature 
of their intercourse, like those of Giere (1973) and Kuhn (1977b), are fairly pessimistic.  
 Through a sympathetic interpretation of N.R. Hanson’s approach to history and 
philosophy of science, this paper argues for a more vigorous type of interaction between the two 
fields. More specifically, the current vogue of the “deflationary” position, which holds that the 
history and philosophy of science are largely incommensurable, is shown to be a result of a 
confused conception of the normative and the descriptive as autonomous and independent forms 
of analysis. A satisfactory account of the interrelation of the history and philosophy of science is 
obtained by uniting two separate, and somewhat inconsistent, elements of Hanson’s philosophy 
of science: his analysis of the conceptual dynamics of science and his explicit formulation of the 
relation between history and philosophy of science. It is argued that the essential elements of his 
view remain legitimate and that extension of his approach is more likely to overcome the 
contemporary rift between philosophers and historians of science than the historiographic 
approaches of Lakatos and Kuhn. 
  
II. Hanson’s Role in History and Philosophy of Science 
Perhaps no one can claim to have done as much for the union of history and philosophy of 
science as Norwood Russell Hanson. In 1960, Hanson became the founding chair of the 
University of Indiana’s Graduate Program in the History and Philosophy of Science, the first of 
                                               
1 It may no longer be proper to speak of a marriage, since another suitor has entered the fray: STS. Perhaps we might 
say we now have a love triangle, and one which, after the manner of love triangles, is divisive and far from 
convenient. 
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its kind, and soon after to become a department. However, from the very beginning, the program 
was a subject of dispute (to the extent that the Philosophy Department would not allow the word 
“philosophy” to appear in the fledgling program’s title (cf. Grau 1999, S302 and Veatch 1997, p. 
114 for additional information on naming of department) and Hanson’s own connection with it 
was not to last very long. In addition to his historical and philosophical work, Hanson also 
devoted considerable effort to determining how the relation between history and philosophy of 
science is to be understood. However, for having been one of the brightest luminaries of the early 
days of HPS, interest in Hanson’s philosophical and historical work over the past forty years has 
been confined to a few select areas like his analysis of observation, his arguments for a logic of 
discovery, and his defense of the Copenhagen Interpretation.  
Hanson shared the positivist view that the function of philosophy of science is to examine 
and clarify the conceptual foundations of science, though he differed from the positivists in 
thinking that science – both historical and contemporary – provides guidance for philosophy. In a 
sense, Hanson can be seen not so much as criticizing logical positivism as extending the field of 
conceptual analysis to areas the positivists had considered off-limits, like the context of 
discovery and the conceptualization of perception. Most importantly for this discussion, Hanson 
also believed that philosophical accounts of science should not be concerned with the static 
frameworks of the “catalog sciences” or with the type of science done within such frameworks, 
but instead with the most dynamic and formative stages of scientific development. 
 While Hanson is now remembered as a philosopher – and he identified himself primarily 
as one – his contributions to history of science, both in terms of his own research and his role as 
an institution builder, are far from trivial. Hanson’s two long works, Patterns of Discovery and 
The Concept of the Positron, are both heavily concerned with historical issues; The Concept of 
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the Positron, in particular, incorporating as it did material based on interviews and 
correspondence with Dirac, Anderson, Blackett, and other principals involved, contains some 
very significant history of science. 
On the institutional side, as has been mentioned, Hanson founded America’s first HPS 
Department at the University of Indiana. Originally a member of Indiana’s Philosophy 
Department, Hanson approached the newly hired historian Edward Grant “[w]ith mischief in his 
eyes” (Grau, p. S300) with a plan to create a program in History and Philosophy of Science. Due 
to his mistrust of the Philosophy Department, Hanson, along with Grant, eventually succeeded in 
proposing a new and independent department in HPS. The new department received instant 
acclaim, with no less an authority than Alexandre Koyré having said, “Indiana University has 
now become the center for studies in the history and logic of science in the world” (quoted on 
S303, Grau). Marie Boas Hall, one of the members of the department in the early 1960’s, 
represents Hanson has having “for some reason longed to move to Yale (p. S82)” after 
recovering from injuries sustained in a plane crash. Upon Hanson’s departure from Indiana, Hall 
found the environment there less appealing, and the original members of the department 
scattered; the department also lost its distinctive orientation as it lost its original members. Had 
Hanson remained at Indiana longer – indeed had he lived longer – perhaps his historical 
significance to HPS would be more highly appreciated.  
The orientation of the Indiana HPS Department was expressed characteristically by 
Hanson in a grant application to the Office of Aerospace Research in 1962: “Each of us has been 
concerned with the structure of scientific argument, whether those of late-medieval mathematics 





centuries, or of early-20
th
-century physics, or contemporary microphysics, mathematics, and the 
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social sciences. It is the ideas, concepts, propositions – the structure of arguments which is our 
concern” (quoted in Grau, p. S306). This statement, which presumably was acknowledged to be 
accurate by the Department’s historians (Edward Grant, A. Rupert Hall, and Marie Boas Hall), 
marks out the principal region of shared concern for philosophers and historians of science: 
historically situated scientific arguments. 
 Hanson advocated institutional integration of HPS: history of science and philosophy of 
science should retain their disciplinary identities, but need to stand in a close, collaborative 
relation to one another if they wish to stem their respective vices of blindness and emptiness. 
While many philosophers of science and historians of science today would assent to this view, 
there is little consensus concerning the reasons why such an interrelation is necessary; I shall, 
thus, present Hanson’s reasoning behind the view and analyze the extent to which  Hanson’s 
account could be extended into contemporary contexts. 
 
III. Hanson on Conceptual Dynamics 
Hanson’s philosophical orientation was focused on making sense of both the logical and 
interpretive aspects of science. Hanson’s forays into experimental psychology, Oxford analysis, 
and the study of Peirce, were all motivated by a desire to make sense of the rationality of science, 
in all of its forms, and it was this emphasis on the normative aspects of science that kept his 
philosophical theory together. 
 
a. Patterns of Discovery  
 
 Hanson’s optimism regarding commerce between history of science and philosophy of 
science is a central theme of his first and still most influential long work, Patterns of Discovery. 
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Utilizing insights from ordinary language philosophy, history of science, and psychology, 
Hanson made the case that, as a matter of fact, scientific thinking and observation are always 
laden with conceptual and theoretical elements. More importantly – and this is the aspect of 
Hanson’s argument that many philosophers pass over – science would not be the rich and 
versatile instrument it is were it not so loaded with theory and expectation. Thus, Hanson argued 
that science’s deep conceptual interconnectedness is what accounts for its epistemic power, for 
its normative character. Hanson marshals a collection of descriptive claims in Patterns of 
Discovery in the interest of clarifying the normative aspects of science. 
 Hanson’s goal was to elucidate the ‘open’ structure of scientific frameworks, as opposed 
to the rigid, definitional networks of geometry, formal logic, and pure mathematics. Formalist 
philosophy of science, epitomized by the logical positivists, sought to impose the clean 
definitional structure of formal systems onto the subject matter of science. Such a procrustean 
enterprise not only fails to aid us in our understanding of science, but it generates useless 
linguistic paradoxes that divert our attention from actual science.  
 While the received thrust of Patterns of Discovery was an attack on logical positivist 
accounts of observation, Hanson’s explicit intent was to illuminate the processes through which 
new conceptual frameworks are constructed and thereby to render the analysis of scientific 
discovery rationally appraisable:  
 
In Patterns of Discovery … ‘explaining x’ is represented as ‘setting x into a 
conceptual framework’. Discovery is thus characterized as ‘the dawning of an 
aspect of x’ such that x is at last seen as part of a more comprehensive and 
comprehensible pattern; earlier, x might have been anomalous in seeming not to 
fit any intelligible organization of ideas. (Hanson, Notes Toward a Logic of 
Discovery, p. 48) 
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For Hanson’s project to succeed, it was necessary to recast the central epistemological concepts 
of science in a manner that is true to their use in science, instead of relying on unenlightening 
formulaic constructions. Hanson’s description of the proper relation between psychological and 
epistemological analyses, a relation that parallels the one he forges between history and 
philosophy of science, is illustrative of his general approach to conceptual foundations: 
 
[T]he factual details of discovery constitute a subject matter for psychology – 
wherein words like ‘intuition’, ‘insight’, ‘hunch’, ‘in a flash’, etc., are 
descriptively associated with the phenomenon to be investigated. But that such 
spectacular reorganizations of concepts do occur is a matter of profound 
epistemological importance. [Patterns of Discovery] traced some philosophical 
implications of such sudden coagula in the data of scientific perception. (Hanson, 
ibid, p. 48) 
 
Hanson’s discussion of observation was intended to provide a methodological gestalt for the 
proper understanding of apparently opposed concepts in scientific epistemology. It is carefully 
presented in what follows since it makes clear, by extension, Hanson’s model of the interrelation 
of forms of analysis generally.  
 Hanson’s critique of the logical positivists’ philosophy of language, as well as to their 
commitment to phenomenalism, illustrates his general approach to categorical divisions. The 
positivists conceived of observation as involving the clamping of an intellectual interpretation 
onto a purely given sensation. Hanson asks whether such a picture of perception is capable of 
conflicting with conceivable states of affairs and concludes that it cannot be. Therefore, the 
positivist account of observation’s central components is unfalsifiable and fails to qualify as 
empirical. It could, of course, be argued that the positivist account is still acceptable if its 
linguistic constructions were simply representations of our most natural habits of speaking about 
observation. Hanson points out, however, that the sense-datum theorists, and their forebears, did 
violence to ordinary speech in their attempt utterly to sunder terms like ‘interpretation’ and 
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‘perception’. The positivist is forced, by an ineradicable fondness for an a priori theory of 
observation, to consider aspect shifts as cases of ‘instantaneous interpretation’. Hanson has two 
main objections to this way of speaking. 
 The first objection is that in ordinary discourse we understand interpretation to be 
something we can either engage in or refrain from performing – to call all acts of perception acts 
of interpretation is to render the term ‘interpretation’ relatively meaningless, since it applies 
everywhere. Furthermore, if it makes sense to speak of something as being interpreted, we ought 
to have some conception of what that something is prior to being interpreted. For instance, it is 
perfectly clear that an interpretation of Moby Dick is something distinct from the book itself, and 
something the book could easily get along fine without. Thus, to speak meaningfully about 
interpretations in perception, we should at least be able to conceive of a completely uninterpreted 
perception; but this we cannot do. 
 Hanson’s second objection concerns some natural language assumptions concerning the 
use of the word ‘interpretation’. First of all, interpretation is an activity, and it takes time to occur 
– it makes sense to say that one is halfway through interpreting something, as when one 
translates a manuscript from a foreign language. If all the interpreting we speak of in ordinary 
language is understood to involve the passage of time, we do violence to our language, and 
understanding, when we speak of ‘instantaneous interpretations’. Additionally, when one 
interprets something in an ordinary context, one is aware that one is engaging in interpretation; 
cases of scientific observation typically are not characterized by such explicit awareness, so it 
would be misleading to speak of them as being products of interpretation.  
 Hanson objects to the view that observation and interpretation are entirely separate, non-
interdependent items – like “peaches and cream” (Hanson 1964, p. 1) – since such a view blocks 
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our ability to investigate the nature of interpretation empirically. Hanson believed that once we 
divest ourselves of misleading presuppositions, it is clear that observation and interpretation are 
intimately bound together: 
[S]cientific observation and scientific interpretation need neither be joined, nor 
separated. They are never apart – so they need not be joined. They cannot, in 
principle, be separated – and it is conceptually idle to make the attempt. 
Observation and interpretation are related symbiotically such that each 
conceptually sustains the other, while separation kills both. This will not be news 
to any practicing scientist – but it may seem heretical indeed to philosophers of 
science for whom Analysis has become indistinguishable from Division. (Hanson, 
1964, p. 9) 
 
This statement brings us to an interesting general question: if analysis of a concept like 
observation does not lead to the walling off all of the concept’s subordinate elements into strictly 
separate compartments, might we not expect that, when properly analyzed, logic and psychology, 
the descriptive and the normative, and philosophy of science and history of science are not, after 
all, distinct, mutually exclusive pairs? Hanson, of course, gives an affirmative reply, and 
expressed, for instance, the following claim concerning the relation of history and philosophy of 
science: “Let no man completely sunder disciplines that are intimately connected through their 
common concern with ideas, concepts, reasoning, and the argumentation of scientists.” (Hanson, 
1962, p. 581) According to Hanson, such conceptual pairs are to be understood through careful 
analysis of their use. How precisely such conceptual pairs are intermingled, interrelated, and 
complement one another can only be appraised through a study of their functioning within 
particular cases, though he argued that general pattern of interrelation is very like that of 
observation and interpretation: neither is ever found purely on its own – they stand, if at all, 
together. In the next section, Hanson’s account of Galileo’s discovery of the law for free falling 
bodies is presented to demonstrate the way in which the normative and descriptive are 
intermingled in cases of discovery. 
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b. Galileo’s Discovery of Free Fall 
Hanson was concerned to make normative sense of the processes through which scientists on the 
frontier, like Galileo, were able to produce their conceptual innovations. Hanson uses the case of 
Galileo’s discovery of the law for free-falling bodies2 to show that while facts inexpressible in a 
given notation are not impossible to grasp, the practical obstacle such a process involves is very 
conceptually important for understanding the growth of science:  
[T]hinking new thoughts in a conceptual framework not designed to express them 
requires unprecedented physical insights. In the history of physics few could 
sense the importance of things not yet expressible in current idioms. The task of 
the few has been to find means of saying what is for others unsayable. (Hanson 
1958, p. 46) 
 
The point Hanson wishes to make in his discussion of Galileo is of a Wittgensteinian flavor: it is 
possible to form “a concept ‘x’ in a language in which x is not easily expressed.” (Hanson 1958, 
p. 185) Given the extant conceptual, mathematical, and practical experimental context, it was 
most difficult to frame the law of free fall correctly. Galileo was able to give the correct 
proportionality for spaces traversed in free fall, but then claimed that the velocity of a falling 
body is proportional to distance fallen. Thus, he passed from the correct form of the law to a very 
different, incorrect form, but which nonetheless struck him as equivalent since the framework he 
initially worked in provided no good means of measuring time durations, especially on the tight 
scale required for falling.  
                                               
2
 Hanson’s account of Galileo’s discovery of the law of free-fall relies crucially on Alexandre Koyré’s discussion, 
as does much of Kuhn’s thinking. Both Hanson and Kuhn are of course at odds with Stillman Drake’s account, 
based on a more recent analysis of Galileo’s fragments and notes. Drake indicates, contrary to Hanson, that Galileo 
was conscious of the correctness of the square-times law in 1604 (Drake 1989, p. 49). As I.B. Cohen remarks 
(Cohen, Birth of a New Physics, p. 204 – check this), it would appear odd that Galileo would have established such 
a result through experiment so early, and yet would not have presented it. 
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Though all the requisite data, or ‘facts’, were known from the beginning to Galileo, 
Beeckman, and Descartes, the correct law of free-fall was only grasped after a long period of 
confusion. All three persisted in thinking of velocity as a direct proportion to the space traversed, 
rather than, as is correct, a direct proportion of the times. Hanson attributes this apparent 
obtuseness among geniuses to the geometric notation with which such problems were then 
treated, which left no room for the expression of a time axis:  
The thinking of scientists in this period ran along geometrical rails; it was 
constituted of ideas of spatial relations. A ‘time co-ordinate’ would have had little 
significance for these natural philosophers, as little as would a ‘fragrance’ or a 
‘beauty’ co-ordinate. (Hanson 1958, pp. 39-40) 
 
While it was already known, in a sense, that velocity is directly proportional to time, the notation 
of the period induced scientists to organize the phenomena according to spatial reasoning. Also, 
since pile-drivers were the paradigm case of free-fall, distance, both in terms of the initial height 
of the weight and the depth to which the weight sunk (which gave a measurement of velocity), 
was the most obvious parameter of consideration. Spatial properties were more easily measured 
and represented than temporal ones, especially since the times involved were so short, and it took 
the penetrating mind of Galileo to see past this theory-laden factual representation to the correct 
solution. Here we see something like a paradigm at work, particularly insofar as the scientists 
were ‘blinded’ to certain aspects of the phenomena, but Hanson’s emphasis is on how the 
successful conceptual framework was rationally constructed – Hanson’s disbelief in flashes of 
inspiration separates him from Kuhn and it follows directly from his commitment to a normative 
framework. 
In order for Galileo to find a proper mathematical characterization of free fall, he needed 
to fashion a conception of velocity as change of position with respect to time in the place of the 
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confused Aristotelian and impetus notions of speed, which both tended to confuse average and 
instantaneous velocities. (See Kuhn 1977a). How did he acquire such a conception? First, 
Galileo needed to devise various means of measuring time accurately on the scale appropriate for 
free fall. Hence his water clocks and his fretted inclined plane, both of which were only fully 
illuminated in the 1970s by Stillman Drake
3. Galileo also needed to ‘dilute’ the speed of falling 
objects to measurable levels by using the inclined plane. However, before any of thse improved 
measurement techniques could be of real use, Galileo needed to craft the conceptual framework 
within which free fall would be expressible as a systematic mathematical relation, and this 
required the creation of a time axis, which was necessary for framing concepts like ‘moment’ 
and ‘acceleration’. Galileo’s act of creation was not instantaneous, but was extended over the 
course of thirty four years, during which time he slowly shifted from viewing the temporal aspect 
of falling as a negligible and redundant detail to an essential component of the concept of 
velocity. 
For Hanson, the free fall case demonstrates that a good deal of conceptual labor is often 
necessary in order to make certain ‘facts’ expressible. More broadly, such a case has the capacity 
to illustrate how new conceptual structures are built. In particular, we need not assume that new 
conceptual structures are conceived instantaneously, or that their creation is not rationally driven. 




                                               
3
 While Hanson did not emphasize Galileo’s experimental innovations as strongly as contemporary historians and 
philosophers of science do, the insights gained by the close study of experimentation’s role in the creation of 
meaning, particularly in the work of Ian Hacking, David Gooding, and Nancy Nersessian, would only add force to, 
rather than weaken, Hanson’s account. 
 
4 Galileo was not especially keen on laying out the sources of his inspiration, and his works reflect only those things 
about which he was confident. In this respect, he was quite different than his contemporary, Kepler, who seemed to 
revel in the contemplation of his own thought processes as much as in his theories. We can only piece together an 
image of his mental transformations by analyzing his books, letters, notes, and the writings of his contemporaries. 
 13 
More generally for Hanson, and here I am applying his general account to the free fall 
case in a way that he explicitly does not, it was necessary for Galileo to see unconstrained free 
fall, pendulum motion, and falling on inclined planes as phenomena of basically the same type. 
Traditionally, these types of motion were treated as belonging to different fundamental 
categories. For instance, on Aristotle’s account, pendulum motion is violent, whereas the other 
two are natural. It was necessary for Galileo to see these phenomena as of the same type, and his 
conception of nature’s laws as expressions of simple mathematical relations facilitated this 
unification. It also appears reasonable that his focus on mathematical relations (or, his search for 
geometric ratios between measurables) allowed him to distinguish between otherwise similar-
looking formulations that were in fact incompatible. Furthermore, his quest for mathematical 
relations allowed him to detect the implicit contradictions in the “natural” conception of free fall 
(i.e. the view that the speed of a free falling body is proportional to the distance fallen). In short, 
Galileo’s new strategies of seeing as and seeing that enabled him to see past traditional 
conceptual frameworks toward new sets of expectations.  
 Kuhn’s attitude concerning Galileo’s discovery of the law for pendulum oscillations is 
characteristic of his treatment of extraordinary research, and provides a telling contrast to 
Hanson’s presentation of Galileo’s discovery of free fall. Kuhn attributes Galileo’s capacity to 
see the pendulum as a special item to be characterized in terms of period, length, etc. as resulting 
from his having internalized the paradigm of the impetus theory: “what seems to have been 
involved was the exploitation by genius of perceptual possibilities made available by a medieval 
paradigm shift.” (Kuhn 1962, p. 119) While it is no doubt true that the impetus theory provided a 
necessary conceptual bridge from Aristotelian to classical mechanics, its presence alone is not 
sufficient to explain Galileo’s production of a novel conceptual framework. For that, it was not 
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only necessary for Galileo to learn to see differently from Aristotle but from the impetus 
theorists as well. How exactly did he accomplish this? Was his new paradigm the result of an 
extended process or was it a spontaneous creation, an imaginative posit “invented in one piece 
for application to nature”? (Kuhn, 1970c, p. 12) Hanson’s discussion of free fall makes a 
plausible case that Galileo’s process of creation was rational and not paradigm-directed; if 
anything, Hanson’s presentation is a study in the gradual fabrication of a paradigm. 
While Hanson was unable to fill in all the gaps in the conceptual history of Galileo’s 
development of the law for free fall, his framework seems capable of rationally patterning the 
historical facts, such as we have them; it also allows us to infer how the history was likely to 
have unfolded where respectable historical evidence is lacking.  
 
IV. The “Irrelevance” of History of Science to Philosophy of Science 
Philosophers of science are familiar with the following maxim: ‘Philosophy of science without 
history of science is empty; history of science without philosophy of science is blind’. The 
maxim is generally attributed to Imre Lakatos (Lakatos 1978, p. 102), and sometimes to Herbert 
Feigl (Feigl 1970, p. 4), and both Lakatos and Feigl give credit to Kant as the inspiration for their 
nearly identical maxims. However, the maxim was originally expressed by Hanson, who credits 
John Maynard Keynes as its inspiration, in 1962 in his introduction to Keynes’s Treatise on 
Probability: 
Without logical analysis history of science is blind. Without attention to the 
arguments of past scientists, philosophy of science is empty. And without Keynes, 
the rational connection between enquiries within these two disciplines might be 
extremely difficult to perceive. (Hanson 1962a, pp. x-xi) 
 
Not only has Hanson’s clever slogan been purloined, but his distinctive account of the relation of 
philosophy and history of science has been mostly ignored. Hanson’s attitude toward history of 
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science has been taken – not without some warrant considering his flamboyant prose – to be 
somewhat deprecatory
5
. However, Hanson was not, despite the impression one might gather 
from his slogans, anti-historical. Instead, he believed that historians of science ought to address 
the issue of justification within historical context in order to produce quality history of science. 
Histories that abstract entirely away from all normative considerations are rightly viewed as 
being incomplete, since history, like many other disciplines, cannot just shirk its obligation to 
utilize its data and methodology to address issues that interpenetrate it. Far from arguing for a 
diminishment of history’s role, Hanson favors its enlargement: historians should consciously 
attend to questions of justification in context (a context they are in a privileged position to 
comprehend), in addition to performing all their other necessary analysis. At the same time, 
historians need to listen to, and interact with, philosophers concerning models of justification. If 
anything, Hanson’s proposal is a clarification of the respective occupational duties of history of 
science and philosophy of science, as well as a plea for their increased interaction. 
 In his principal article concerning the relation of philosophy and history of science 
(Hanson 1962b)
6
, Hanson argued that the history of science is logically irrelevant to the 
philosophy of science – a surprising position for the founder of the first HPS program in the 
United States to hold. However, what Hanson was worried about in this discussion was the 
genetic fallacy. He thought that if the truth of philosophical claims were dependent on historical 
factors, all demonstrations of philosophical claims would commit the genetic fallacy. To the 
question, “can a philosopher utilize historical facts without collapsing into the “genetic 
fallacy”?” (Hanson 1962b, p. 574) Hanson provides an affirmative answer (perhaps somewhat 
surprisingly in light of the article’s provocative and misleading title). However, the historical 
                                               
5 Jutta Schickore, for instance, characterizes Hanson as a “fervent anti-historian” due to his pronouncements in his 
1962b. (Schickore 2006, p.59) 
6 The Kantian maxim discussed above provides the organizing motif of the article. 
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facts cannot be used as a justification for some philosophical thesis; instead, the historical facts 
can be used as particular premises, as instances of statement forms, within a valid formal 
argument. The particular premises, if true, render a particular substitution instance of the general 
argument sound. 
Hanson distinguished between three modes of interpenetration between history of science 
and philosophy of science. The first mode concerns the overarching philosophical framework, or 
Weltphilosophie, that informs the historian’s selection and interpretation of data7. These ‘cosmic 
commitments’ (Hanson 1962b, p. 574) can be misleading if they are uncritical or 
unacknowledged, though enlightened philosophical criticism has the capacity to dismantle and 
analyze these large-scale elements of mental architecture.  
 Perhaps as a result of philosophical interference, historians of science from the late 
nineteenth century onward became concerned with the second type of interrelation of history and 
philosophy of science: the development of the ‘conceptual bricks and beams’ that compose 
larger-scale intellectual edifices. Historians of science of this cast of mind (Ernst Mach, Pierre 
Duhem, Alexandre Koyré, and Edward Rosen) attempted to chart the development of 
philosophical conceptions like law, demonstration, observation, verification, etc., through 
analysis of historical cases. Much of Hanson’s own work, including his discussions of 
observation and Galileo presented previously, falls into this category. 
The first two modes of interpenetration, the grand philosophical architecture and the 
conceptual bricks and beams, though conspicuous in Hanson’s day, did not typically lead to the 
mutual enlivening of the two fields. Hanson counsels historians and philosophers instead to 
concentrate on the third mode of interpenetration: the arguments of science, the “engineering 
                                               
7 This uncontroversial scheme of data selection is similar to what Koertge calls a ‘conservative reconstruction’. 
When producing a conservative reconstruction “the historian relies on minimal attributions of rationality to the 
actors in the past – he assumes their actions were appropriate to their problem situations (p. 360). 
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connections” that support the edifice of science. “[i]t is in the detailed analysis of the detailed 
arguments of scientists and historians where philosophy can most help, and be helped.” (Hanson 
1962b, p. 576) 
 Expanding upon suggestions of Keynes, Hanson argues that philosophy of science and 
history of science share a concern with the arguments used by historical scientists. It is relevant 
to both fields whether a given theory or statement was well supported by the evidence, as it was 
understood, at the time in question. According to Hanson, Keynes’s argument “that no scientific 
statement is ever probable in itself, but probable only on the assumption of given evidence,” 
(Hanson 1962b, p. 576) opens the door to an objective analysis of the relative reasonableness of 
competing historical theories. Hanson conceives the appraisal of the connection between a theory 
and its evidence to be deductive – whichever theory at a given time that has the highest 
probability relating its assumptions and initial conditions to its consequences is the best theory 
for that time. Hanson explains the manner in which adoption of this approach would transform 
the activity of philosophers of science:  
Assuming an advanced familiarity with a scientific subject matter, then, the 
logician of science should be capable of assessing the formal cogency of 
arguments of, e.g., “steady-state” cosmologists as against “big-bang” theorists: he 
should be able (in principle) to determine which claims of reasoning are the “best 
made,” which conclusions are most likely on the evidence given, which 
assumptions en route are most and least vulnerable. (Hanson 1962b, p. 577) 
 
Note that this analysis yields not the best possible theory, as a pure formalist would desire, but 
the best theory historically available at t
8
 – both history and philosophy are essential to this type 
of analysis. The ‘formal cogency’ of scientific argument thus provides us with a means of 
assessing the quality of conclusions as well as assumptions. Hanson’s commitment to this mode 
                                               
8 We can see that Kuhn’s critical remark regarding the aims of philosophers does not apply to Hanson’s account: the 
philosopher’s “goal is to discovery and state what is true at all times and places rather than to impart understanding 
of what occurred at a particular time and place.” (Kuhn 1977b, p. 5) 
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of proceeding is yet another sign of his adherence to the thesis of what has since come to be 
called explanatory unification. It also demonstrates Hanson’s belief that the evidence in favor of 
a theory can be objectively appraised – this thesis is obviously in conflict with Kuhnian 
incommensurability, since it assumes that what qualifies as evidence is not importantly affected 
by one’s theoretical commitments. Though Hanson is invariably careful when discussing the 
degree to which ‘theories square with the facts’ (Cf. Hanson 1965, p. 58, fn 23), he clearly 
believed that the theoretical loading of factual language presented a merely practical, and 
surmountable, barrier to theory appraisal
9
. 
 Of course, Hanson recognizes the impracticability of producing numerical probability 
figures for theories past. Nonetheless, he does believe that informed inquirers are capable of 
recognizing clear cases of probable and wildly improbable theories, and we can increase our 
certainly by appealing to ever more inclusive sets of initial conditions and historical detail.  
 Let us look more closely at what Hanson’s view entails for the intersection of history and 
philosophy of science, and then note what it means for each discipline separately. Hanson depicts 
their intersection through a colorful metaphor: 
 
[The analysis of important historical arguments] is the “hot” junction box which 
connects the conceptual circuitry in history of science with that of philosophy of 
science. Professionally, the logician and the historian will often be concerned 
exclusively with the rational wiring within that box – the scientific argument itself 
– and not just with the intricate intellectual geometry leading to it and away from 
it, nor with the lights that may go on in the world of science, and the illumination 
afforded by historians of science, as a consequence of that circuitry and that 
junction box being designed as they are. The historian of science and the logician 
are both concerned with the structure of scientific ideas. These concerns fuse into 
                                               
9 There are many striking parallels between Hanson’s view and Kitcher’s (1981) account of explanatory unification. 
Both Kitcher and Hanson argue that explanatory unification considerations ought to make sense of the history of 
science. Also, on Kitcher’s account, rival theories can only be compared relative to a more or less stable and 
theoretically neutral body of facts, which each theory strives to unify. Finally, both Hanson and Kitcher conceive of 
arguments as the entities that unify the facts in an intelligible way. 
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one when the scientific argumentation of the past takes the spotlight. (Hanson 
1962b, pp. 579-580). 
 
 History of science without philosophy of science is blind because without the normative 
concerns of epistemology, the assorted data of history are nothing but a chaotic jumble, whose 
only principle of order is their temporal arrangement. If an historical narrative is to be coherent, 
it must not only refer to the way in which a scientist’s Weltphilosophie and understanding of key 
philosophical concepts of science figured in the course of research, but it most go deeper and 
assess the strength of the arguments offered in support of the theory. Attention to these 
philosophical elements of scientific activity will keep history of science from getting lost – the 
fear of which haunts the blind – by curbing it from losing itself in irrelevant historical 
information and dulling “the scalpels of philosophy by burying them in the historical gravel.” 
(Hanson 1962b, p. 580)  
 Philosophy, according to Hanson, is primarily concerned with assessing the adequacy of 
arguments; hence, his occasional use of ‘logic of science’ as a synonym for ‘philosophy of 
science.” In his 1962b, Hanson seems most keenly interested in defending historically inclined 
philosophers like himself from the charge that they commit the genetic fallacy. One is guilty of 
the genetic fallacy when one holds that the validity of an argument depends on its source. 
Hanson claims that the validity of an argument can in no wise depend on historical facts:  
The logical relevance of history of science to philosophy of science is nil. Staring 
at novel facts has never made old arguments invalid, new arguments valid (or vice 
versa) (Hanson 1962b, p. 585) 
 
However, an argument’s soundness will depend on historical facts, if the premises refer to 
historical episodes. The arguments studied and advanced by philosophers may be perfectly valid 
or cogent, yet nonetheless have no connection to history or everyday reality. Thus, Hanson 
characterizes much of positivist philosophy of science as being guilty of the “fallacy of 
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misplaced abstraction” (Hanson 1962b, p. 582); while such analyses ordinarily possess many 
formal virtues, they have the defect of not really being about anything – one might say that they 
qualify only as philosophy – since they have no subject matter – not philosophy of science. 
Hanson illustrates the interrelation between philosophical and historical analysis of science with 
an appropriately aeronautical conceit: 
 
For a work in philosophy of science to be shot down by philosophers, it must at 
least get off the ground. This is done only via a runway of facts concerning the 
history and present state of the science with which the investigator is concerned. 
Such facts are not germane to the sophisticated professional appraisal of the 
intellectual flight and logical maneuvers demonstrated thereafter. But the 
philosopher of science who does not know intimately the history of the scientific 
problem with which he is exercised is not even airborne. His analytical skill may 
be admirable, but it does not take us anywhere. (Hanson 1962b, p. 586) 
 
 
 Hanson clearly believed that great works in history and philosophy of science embodied 
the type of interpenetration he highlighted, and, presumably, understood his own work on 
Leverrier, Newton’s theory of Fits, and the discovery of the positron as being in the same vein. 
His frustration with the relation of the two fields must have stemmed from the degree to which 
they were bedeviled by misleading conceptual assumptions. 
 The Keynesian formula can, of course, be generalized to cover ranges of time. Thus, it 
can be employed to adjudicate on the reasonableness of a theory over time, e.g., undulatory or 
corpuscularian theories of light in the 19
th
 century, or theories of special creation in the early 19
th
 
century. This extension of the formula, however, does not go beyond anything Hanson 
advocated, representing, as it does, integration of the formula over a range of time. 
 Philosophers have long been keen on proffering methods; history of science has also been 
populated with a multitude of methodological pronouncements. Perhaps one could legitimately 
use history to determine which method was most likely to lead to discovery in some field over 
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some range of time. In fact, it would seem as though, if philosophy of science is to possess any 
prescriptive force whatsoever, it would need to derive such force from a Keynesian analysis of 
methodological efficacy. Another shortcoming of the Keynesian formula is that it leaves out of 
account notions like promise, simplicity, consistency, consilience, fecundity, and elegance. Such 
notions have been instrumental in the historical development of scientific theories, and their role 
seems to be straightforwardly normative. In the final section of this paper, I will argue that 
generalizing the Keynesian formula such that it ranges over facts of human cognition and 
historical patterns of argument will provide a framework in which the history and philosophy of 
science can be usefully interrelated.   
 
V. Comparison to Rival Accounts of Historiography: Kuhn and Lakatos 
Arguably, the two most influential historiographies on philosophers of science have been those 
of Kuhn and Lakatos. While there are some obscure and unsatisfactory features of Hanson’s 
account of the relationship of philosophy and history of science, it has some advantages over the 
historiographies of Kuhn and Lakatos. Hanson argued that Kuhn’s model of science is guilty of 
conceptual circularity, and therefore non-empirical; had he lived long enough to see Lakatos’s 
program reach its peak, he surely would have offered up the same criticism. 
 It is common to think of Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions as deriving a 
descriptive model of science from a study of its history. Lakatos exemplified this reading in his 
(1978) and argued that Kuhn’s account is defective due to its having shut out all normative 
analysis. Since Kuhn’s historiography is commonly thought to be too heavily inclined toward 
merely descriptive analysis, and since discussion of that topic is so well known, I will not discuss 
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criticisms of that type, but instead will present Hanson’s very own original critique of Kuhn’s 
account of method. 
 Hanson was one of the earliest readers of Structure of Scientific Revolutions, since he 
refereed it for University of Chicago Press
10
. Hanson argued that Kuhn’s model of science was 
not only something more than description, but that its central concepts were defined in terms of 
one another (Cf. Hanson 1965 as well). If every revolution involves paradigm replacement, and 
every paradigm replacement is by necessity a revolution, then Kuhn’s view, because of its 
circularity, is insulated against falsification. Hanson argues that the model of science Kuhn 
presents lacks the normative characteristics of an empirical theory of science: “As a genuine 
historical thesis, Kuhn’s must be like all others – factually true (for the most part) but vulnerable-
in-principle to possible counter-evidence.” (Hanson 1965, p. 371) That Hanson criticized Kuhn 
on these grounds indicates that he held his own accounts of science and history of science as 
possessing the capacity to conflict with the facts.  
 Hanson challenged Kuhn to explain two historical cases in which paradigm replacement 
and revolution did not go hand-in-hand – a challenge Kuhn never took up or even addressed. In 
the end, Hanson seemed critical of models of science that aspire to cover all possible cases, and 
asserted that legitimate history concerns itself with generalizations that usually admit of 
exceptions (Hanson 1965, p. 373).  
 Kuhn’s perceptive article (1977) on the relation of the history and philosophy of science 
does little to free him of the charges that his theory is either entirely descriptive (Lakatos) or that 
it is semantically impoverished (Hanson). Kuhn asserted, like Hanson, that history and 
philosophy of science should retain their disciplinary identities, but should rely on one another 
                                               
10 I owe Eric Schliesser a debt of gratitude for having provided me with a copy of the referee report (Hanson 1961). I 
also thank Jordi Cat for having called the whole matter to my attention. 
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when needed. However, he represents philosophers as needing history far more than historians 
philosophy. He argues, based mainly on his teaching experience, that historians and philosophers 
bring characteristic intellectual ‘sets’ to their study of the history of science, and he characterizes 
the perspectival divide between history and philosophy as being like that encountered in an 
aspect shift. 
 Kuhn identified himself as a working historian, as one engaged in putting scattered 
elements of data into a sensible arrangement. He didn’t view historians as dealing with 
arguments, but rather as constructing narratives based on a primitive notion of similarity, like 
that which guides a child through the putting together of a jigsaw puzzle. It is rather odd that he 
did not explicitly regard history of science as being governed by paradigms, particularly since 
history is a discipline that has undergone dramatic periodic shifts in the methods of argument, 
data selection, and narrative construction. Importantly, on Kuhn’s view, history has little need of 
the insights of other disciplines, since its guiding methodological principle is primitive and, 
presumably, not subject to change. Clearly, the view that history is a methodologically self-
contained discipline does much to stifle interaction with philosophy, as well as with other fields.  
 The notion of the “rational reconstruction”, so critical to the historiography of the 
positivists and Popperians, does not figure prominently in Hanson’s work. Needless to say, the 
radicalized version of the rational reconstruction championed by Lakatos, with all of its 
fascinating and troubling perplexities, is also not a part of Hanson’s historiography.  
 If histories are to be reconstructed along the lines of a philosophical theory of rationality, 
in what way does that theory of rationality get critically appraised? Of course, if the theory of 
rationality is purely formal and a priori justified, then its critical evaluation will be 
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unproblematic
11. Lakatos’s model of “sophisticated falsificationism”, by contrast, does not seem 
capable of any history- or experience-independent justification – if anything, it seems merely 
calculated to align with our historically-informed intuitions concerning the historical workings of 
science. As such, the methodology of competing research programs appears to be incorrigible by 
more searching historical study or by future experience with science. The foundations of 
Lakatos’s methodology, thus, seem to suffer from difficulties very similar to those plaguing 
inductivism, since such foundations cannot be derived either from pure reason or from 
experience. While Lakatos’s model certainly seems “agreeable to reason”, it appears to be 
incapable of falsification or rationally driven revision.  
 When philosophy of science is strongly identified with normative analysis, as it is in 
Lakatos’s account, it departs from the simple world of facts and history. Lakatos claimed, for 
instance, that his methodology expresses a set of truths in Popper’s third world (cf. Lakatos and 
Musgrave 1970, pp. 179-180, esp. fn. 1 on 179), and thus is not subject to falsification by the 
facts. Kuhn’s reaction to Lakatos’s historiography is typical of historians, and illustrates why 
Lakatos’s historiography has found little sympathy among pure historians. While Kuhn admits 
that all case studies are rational reconstructions (Kuhn 1970b, p. 256), he asserts that a historian 
of science could never in good conscience present historically false claims as though they were 
true, as Lakatos advises. As we have already seen, Hanson was also critical of such moves, and 
argued that models of science, if they are to be anything more than word games, must be capable 
of coming into conflict with historical facts.  
 Hanson outlines the terms for a fruitful interplay between history of science and 
philosophy of science. What is distinctive about Hanson’s view is the primacy of normative 
                                               
11 Popper’s approach to scientific method attempted to embody the ideal of formal justification, though it famously 
failed since it had to introduce non- a priori elements in order to save itself from problems introduced by holism of 
testing and its poor fit with actual history of science. 
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criteria, both within the disciplines themselves and in terms of their interaction; the flipside of 
this is that normative constraints must themselves be capable of conflicting with the facts. The 
historian has a set of normative criteria that govern the selection of materials, and the 
construction of narratives – such normative criteria set the ground rules for the production of 
historical descriptions. In addition to those normative elements that are necessary for producing 
historical descriptions are those that are concerned with the rationality of certain historically 
situated beliefs and epistemic practices; it is here where philosophy of science and history of 
science have their most substantial overlap. 
 
VI. Conclusions and Criticism 
Philosophy and history of science each have a default position that guards against illicit 
incursions by the other. Philosophers discuss the genetic fallacy, or at least they used to, and 
argue that the revision of philosophical positions in light of historical evidence is to be avoided. 
Of course, the hidden assumption in such an approach is that philosophical models of science 
must be a priori, an assumption that few philosophers today would accept without qualification, 
though the idea is still central to philosophy of science as a discipline. Historians, on the other 
hand, abstain from offering normative judgments for fear of engaging in ‘whiggish’ 
interpretation (Cf. Laudan (1990) and Nickles (1995)). Each of these positions is committed to a 
hopeless epistemology, and while Hanson seemed to share the philosopher’s occupational 
scruples concerning the genetic fallacy, in many areas he clearly violated, with valuable results, 
these two disciplinary constraints.  Furthermore, it seems that Hanson’s own philosophical 
account, which suffers from some conflicts and tensions, if not inconsistencies, can be 
ameliorated by drawing together his account of conceptual dynamics and the appraisal of 
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historical arguments. More importantly, such an improved interpretation of Hanson’s position is 




Hanson’s treatments of observation and Galileo’s discovery of the law of free fall rely on 
historical and empirical facts; nonetheless, from such facts, normative lessons can be gathered. 
Clearly these discussions are concerned with a posteriori normative criteria. Philosophers of 
science are still concerned to analyze the foundations of our normative pronouncements, even 
those that are non-deductive. If one wishes to appraise the adequacy of a method of discovery, or 
evaluate the promise of a new theory, one then needs to assess the connections lying within a 
body of empirical data; i.e. one will be appealing to a posteriori normative criteria, just as 
Hanson implicitly referred to in his account of Galileo. In what follows, I will argue that 
broadening the Keynesian formula to range over facts about human cognition and the inference 
patterns used in discovery provides a powerful tool for the normative appraisal of science, since 
it would then cover both a priori and a posteriori normative criteria. 
With respect to the Keynesian formula, Hanson did his utmost to craft an a priori 
justified instrument for the normative appraisal of the history of science. However, we might 
wish to inquire more closely into the type of normativity offered by Hanson’s Keynesian formula 
for analyzing the well-groundedness of a theory at some point in history. The Keynesian formula 
specifies the probability for a given theory to be true at time t, and thus gives a measure of what 
one ought to believe at t. It grounds normativity of belief, but not normativity of method: it does 
not tell us how we ought to theorize if we wish to discover some new, or comparatively superior, 
theory. We might have expected, especially from Hanson considering his enduring interest in 
                                               
12 This is the metaphor Hanson uses for his middle course between formalism and sensationalism with respect to 
perception (Hanson 1971, p. 1) 
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discovery, a normative analysis, based upon historical data points, of reasonable methods to 
generate new theories. In fact, to confine our interest in the annals of history to the search for 
answers to the question, “What was the most reasonable belief to have about phenomenon x at 
time t?” is to leave out a great deal. We should also wish to know what the best way would have 
been to proceed at t in order to arrive at a theory capable of explaining x. It appears likely that a 
normative analysis of method would have to be a posteriori, since the idea that we could offer 
directives about how to conduct science optimally with no experience of the world seems absurd. 
It is reasonable to include our knowledge of human cognition in our reckoning of all the 
facts as we know them. Doing so would give us greater capacity to appraise methods of 
theorizing; surely the facts concerning human cognition must figure in an account of how best to 
proceed in enlarging our knowledge, if not even our calculations of what would be the most 
rational thing to believe at t. The kinds of things we can know, and the kinds of inferences we are 
able effectively to produce, are relevant to how we should proceed in our theorizing. After all, 
everyday problem solving strategies are normatively loaded, as Hanson mentions, “Many 
features of the actual problem solving of ordinary people, and of ordinary scientists, require 
understanding the criteria in virtue of which one can distinguish good reasons from bad 
reasons.”13 (Hanson 1971, p. 64). Leaving these strategies out of our epistemology of science, 
simply because their logical character is non-deductive, leads to an impoverished epistemology. 
 Complete generalization of the Keynesian formula could lead to a full logical analysis of 
the conceptual dynamics of science. Not only would we be able to say which theories are most 
highly supported at t, but we could also determine which strategies – formal or informal – are 
most likely to lead to success during some historical period. Hanson’s writings on the logic of 
discovery, particularly the early articles, were concerned with exactly such a project. It is useful 
                                               
13 Italics in original. 
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to distinguish between a priori and a posteriori forms of normativity, and it is a mistake to 
regard the a posteriori forms as so historically tainted that they are irrelevant to philosophers, 
just as it is an error to suppose that the historical objectivity of narratives will be inevitably 
contorted by considerations of rationality. Instead of absolutely separating the normative and the 
descriptive, philosophers and historians of science should remain aware of the ways in which 
normative judgments depend upon, or are corrigible by, empirical facts; conversely, the 
empirical facts must be seen as being filtered by over-arching, though revisable, principles of 
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